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CHAPTER 1 
Search and Seizure 
EVAN Y. SEMERJIAN 
§l.l. Introduction. During the 1972 SURVEY year, the Supreme 
Court of the United States issued opinions in only four cases involving 
search and seizure, most of them relatively uncontroversiaI.l By contrast, 
the Supreme Judicial Court decided 15 cases on this subject,2 many of 
them raising difficult questions, and somB of them producing surprising 
results. The law of search and seizure is probably one of the most con-
fused areas of criminal law. Even the United States Supreme Court has 
failed adequately to clarify the law. As Justice Harlan, concurring in the 
Court's 1971 decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,3 observed: "From 
the several opinions that have been filed in this case it is apparent that 
the law of search and seizure is due for an overhauling."4 
§1.2. Warrantless entries on land. The courts have generally ex-
tended the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches 
and seizures to include the "curtilage," or the ground and buildings im-
mediately surrounding a dwelling and used in connection with it, l but 
not including "open fields."2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Commonwealth v. Colella3 held that a natural resource officer, acting 
without a search warrant, legally entered the back yard of a dwelling 
and searched for stolen lobster pots. The Court reversed the trial judge's 
order suppressing evidence of the lobster pots found there during the 
EVAN Y. SEMERJIAN is a junior partner in Hale & Dorr, Boston. 
§l.l. 1 United States v. BisweII, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (permitting warrant-
less seaoch and seizure of guns under Gun Control Act); Adams v. Williams, 407 
U.S. 143 (1972) (permitting seizure of handgun during "stop and frisk" interroga-
tion); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972) (remanding for determination 
of standing to object); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (reversing 
civil contempt finding for refusal to testify at grand jury proceedings where wit-
ness's conversation was wiretapped in violation of Title III of Omnibus Crime 
Control Act of 1968). 
2 The search and seizure cases amount to approximately 3.5% of the Court's 
total caseload of 421 cases. See Tauro, The State of the Judiciary, 57 Mass. L.Q. 
209 (1972). 
3 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 413 (1971). 
4 Id. at 490 (concurring opinion) . 
§1.2. 1 Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968); 
Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966). 
2 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 273 N.E.2d 874. 
1
Semerjian: Chapter 1: Search and Seizure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
4 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §1.2 
search. In Colella a natural resource officer (Officer Nagle) had received 
a complaint from a lobsterman of missing lobster pots. Just before dis-
covering that the lobster pots were missing, the lobsterman had seen 
in the vicinity a blue and white boat with a "hippie flower" painted on 
its side. During his investigation over a period of several days, the officer 
eventually found the boat and various lobster buoys and lobster pots in 
the back yard of a dwelling situated along the Mystic River in Medford.4 
The next day, from a position across the Mystic River, the officer ob-
served through binoculars variously marked lobster buoys in the back 
yard of the dwelling. Still proceeding without a search warrant, he then 
crossed the river, parked nearby and approached the dwelling. When 
he received no response after knocking on the front and back doors, the 
officer entered the back yard and examined the lobster buoys and lobster 
pots. Later the same day the officer returned to the dwelling with the com-
plaining lobsterman who identified his lobster pots among those piled in 
the back yard. On the following day (two days after the initial discovery 
of the boat) Officer Nagle, accompanied by other natural resource officers 
and the local police, had a "conversation" with the defendant at the 
dwelling. The defendant "'readily agreed' that the pots 'would be 
confiscated.' "5 
According to the Court, the "real questions" in the case were, (1) 
"whether Officer Nagle's entry on the land was an unlawful trespass or 
search," and (2) "whether the later taking of the lobster pots was so di-
rectly the consequence of that entry, if illegal, as to require suppressing 
the evidence."6 On the first question, the Court concluded that the 
authority for the officer's warrantless entry on the land derived from 
G.L., c. 21, §6D, which provides that 
... natural resource officers and deputies may in the performance of 
their duties enter upon and pass through or over private property or 
lands whether or not covered by water, and may keep or dispose of 
sick, injured or helpless fish, birds or mammals, that may come into 
their possession. . . . 
Although there is nothing in this section which permits entry on private 
property to search for lobster pots believed to be stolen, and although its 
obvious purpose is to protect fish, birds and mammals, the Court never-
4 Officer Nagle's first observation of the boat occurred while he was conducting 
a helicopter inspection of the Mystic River area. At that time he also observed 
variously marked lobster buoys in a pile -of lobster pots near the boat. G.L., c. 130, 
§38 provides that an applicant for a lobster license must state his color scheme or 
other special buoy marking and all his buoys shall be marked accordingly. It is 
possible that Officer Nagle may have acquired sufficient information at this point 
to warrant a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant. See text at note 17, 
infra. 
5 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 1301, 273 N.E.2d 874, 875. 
6 Id. at 1306, n.4, 273 N.E.2d at 878, n.4. 
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theless held that "The Legislature, in our opinion, has reasonably provided 
in §6D for the natural resource inspection of at least land and equipment 
used for purposes subject to statutory natural resource regulation."7 By 
this language, the Court apparently considered the duties of natural re-
source officers to be limited to enforcement of natural resource statutes 
and regulations. This construction is supported by the language of Sec-
tions 6 and 6A, authorizing the appointment of natural resource officers 
to "carry out the duties of the division" and "to enforce all penal laws 
which it is the duty of the department to enforce ... inclruding the laws 
relating to fish, birds, mammals, dogs, and fires .... " However, on the 
basis of Section 6B, which grants such officers "all the authority of police 
officers and constables, except the service of civil process," the Attorney 
General has concluded that they have "general police powers with respect 
to all criminal violations of the laws of the Commonwealth."8 It is of 
interest, however, that the Court never discussed Section 6B. 
It is important to note that the Court construed Section 6D to authorize 
only a warrantless entry and not a subsequent search for stolen property 
or seizure of that property. The only statutory authority for natural re-
source officers to conduct searches and seizures appears in G.L., c. 130, §9, 
a statute pertaining to illegally taken fish.9 The Court concluded, how-
ever, that Section 9 was inapplicable: 
Although this section purportedly permits warrantless searches, in in-
stances mentioned in the section, [Chapter] 130, §1O, permits an 
authorized officer to issue warrants to search for illegally held fish 
in marine fisheries matters. There is no indication, however, in this 
record that Officer Nagle was looking for lobsters illegally taken. He 
was trying to find stolen lobster pots. Chapter 21, §6D, appears to be 
the sole provision which deals with the warrantless entry upon land.10 
(Court's emphasis). 
In further support of its determination that Section 6D authorized 
Officer Nagle's warrantless entry, the Court relied on Thurlow u. Cross-
7 Id. at 1304, 273 N.E.2d at 877. 
8 Op. Atty. Gen. 76 (Aug. 5, 1963). 
9 "IHeg.ally taken fish" in this context does not mean stolen or misappropriated 
fish, but rather fish caught or trapped in violation of any marine fisheries law. 
G.L., c. 130, §9 provides: "[A] IUttural resou.n:e officer ... may, without a war-
rant, search any boat, vessel, fish car, bag, box, locker, package, crate, any build-
ing other than a dwelling house, any motor vehicle ... or other vehicle, or any 
other personal property in which he has reasonable cause to believe, and does be-
lieve, that fish taken . . . or held for transportation or sale in violation of law, 
may be found, and may ·seize any such fish . . . and may seize any boat . . . box 
... package, crate .... or any other personal property used in a violation of the 
laws relative to marine fisheries and hold tlhe same for forfeiture. Any such . . . 
officer may arrest without a warrant any person found violating any provision of 
this chapter or of any ordinance, rule or regulation made under authority thereof, 
or any other provision of law relative to marine fisheries." 
10 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 1302, n.2, 273 N.E.2d 874, 876, n.2. 
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manU and Commonwealth v. Murphyp two cases upholding under Sec-
tion 6D warrantless entries by natural resource officers. Both these cases, 
however, concerned the illegal taking of shellfish and had nothing what-
ever to do with stolen property. 
Next, the Court considered the question whether the lobster pots 
found on defendant's property were in a constitutionally protected area, 
presumably on the implicit assumption that Section 6D does not over-
ride the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In dealing with this 
question, the Court declared that even if the lobster pots were assumed 
to be within a "curtilage," Section 6D excluded only entry of dwellings, 
buildings "intimately used or connected with dwellings," and "sub-
stantially enclosed" areas.13 In the absence of proof that the lobster pots 
were within such excluded building or area, the Court held the officer's 
inspection was justified. The Court also observed that the "lobster pots 
were piled in plain view ... on open land" but seemed reluctant to rest 
its holding on the plain view doctrine noting that "the subject remains 
filled with uncertainties."14 However, the lobster pots did not appear to 
be in an open field, but on the contrary were in the back yard of a 
dwelling in the city of Medford "about 100 feet down the driveway" 
from the sidewalk.1S Thus the lobster pots had to be substantially closer 
than 100 feet to the back of the dwelling. In these circumstances, that 
portion of the back yard area embracing the location of the pile of 
lobster pots should qualify as part of the protected "curtilage" since the 
resident of the dwelling would reasonably expect to preserve it as a private 
area in conjunction with the dwelling itself.16 
U 336 Mass. 248, 143 N.E.2d 812 (1957). 
12 353 Mass. 433, 233 N.E.2d 5 (1968). 
13 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 1303-04, 273 N.E.2d 874, 877. 
14 Id. at 1304, 273 N.E.2d at 877. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971), four Justices of the United States Supreme Court were of ,the opinion bhat 
"[ w] hat the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each 
of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came 
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused." (Emphasis 
added). 403 U.S. at 466. Four Justices disagreed insofar as an "inadvertent" sight-
ing of the evidence was an essential element of the plain view doctrine. The re-
maining member of the Court, Justice Harla;n, created the "uncertainty" because 
he expressed no opinion as to the oorrectness of eitiher view. Clearly, under the 
former view, ·the "plain view" doctrine would not apply to Colella, while under 
the latter view, ~he inspection of the lobster pots would have been within the plain 
view doctrine, assuming the entry under Section 6D was justified. 
15 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 1300, 273 N.E.2d 874, 875. 
16 See, e.g., Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(items in backyard of lodge within 35 feet thereof in constitutionally protected 
curtilage). See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE 28-29 (1968), wherein the ,Criminal Division, in instructing law en-
forcement officers on the applicable rules, states: "Get a warrant when searching 
either houses or curtilage. You must show probable cause .... CURTILAGE is the 
open space surrounding the dwelling which the average person woulld consider a 
part of the house .... IF IN DOUBT TREAT THE AREA SURROUNDING 
4
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According to the Court, even if the area was constitutionally protected 
because of the impact of recent federal decisions on the Section 6D war-
rantless entry, there was still no unlawful search and seizure for the 
reason that: 
Officer Nagle, before he went upon the premises ... had probable 
cause to believe that Colella was in possession of buoys and pots not 
his own. The entry (not a trespass under c. 21, §6D) merely con-
firmed and added detail to his prior knowledge. He made no seizure 
when he entered. Even if the entry on the land would now be re-
garded as improper under recent decisions, Officer Nagle's basic and 
essential knowledge was not the fruit of that entry. His ultimate 
seizure of the lobster pots was in Colella's presence and (as we read 
the record) with his consentP 
Although the reasoning in this passage is not altogether clear, it is doubt-
ful that the Court intended to reject the well-established warrant re-
quirement for searches of curtilage.18 On the other hand, if the Court 
was upholding the seizure on the basis of consent, then further serious 
questions are raised. 
From the facts appearing in the opinion, it is apparent that the de-
fendant at the time of seizure was not in an environment conducive to 
making a free choice. He was surrounded by natural resource officers 
and police officers, and had no counsel. That the defendant "readily 
agreed" that the lobster pots "would be confiscated" is hardly a clear 
statement that he consented to the confiscation. Accordingly, it would 
have been desirable to set forth a fuller treatment of this problem in the 
opinion, especially in view of the absence of proof of an intelligent waiver 
or intentional relinquishment of the defendant's rights.19 It would also 
THE HOUSE AS CURTILAGE .... YOU DON'T NEED A WARRANT 
TO SEARCH 'OPEN FIELDS' .... An area 50 to 100 yards from a defendant's 
residence is open field unless there is some direct relationship between that field 
and the defendant's dwelling tha.t would lead a reasonable person to believe that 
it was part of the curtilage." 
17 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 1305, 273 N.E.2d 874, 878. 
18 Indeed, the Court admonished all law enforcement officers that as a matter 
of "precaution and policy" search warrants ought to be secured before making 
inspections or entries on land, particularly when no emergency situation exists. 
1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 1305, 273 N.E.2d 874, 878. The admonition seems 
especially appropriate on the facts of Colella where the officer had sufficient evi-
dence prior to the entry to establish probable cause and where, patently, no 
emergency existed. 
19 "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of 
a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and 
voluntarily given." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Com-
pare Commonwealth v. Stroud, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 775, 281 N.E.2d 599 and 
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 681, 281 N.E.2d 243, in which 
the Court considered the consent issue. 
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have been possible to remand the case for further findings on this ques-
tion, since the case was still in its interlocutory stages. 20 
During the SURVEY year the Court again dealt with a warrantless entry 
on private property in Commonwealth v. Spikes.21 In Spikes a Brockton 
police officer had been wounded and disarmed when he attempted to 
thwart an armed robbery at a Western Union office. About 45 minutes 
later, the police went to the defendant's home where, in the driveway, 
they observed a car similar to one seen in the vicinity of the robbery. An 
officer flashed a light into three trash barrels outside the house and in 
one of them found two revolvers, a set of car keys and several articles 
of clothing. One of the revolvers was a type used by Brockton police; 
the keys fit the car in defendant's driveway and the car's engine was still 
warm. The police then arrested the defendant at the premises. 
The Court held that the warrantless search of the trash barrel was not 
illegal because "the trash barrel was open, and the police were on the 
premises to apprehend an individual who had already given evidence 
that he would use a gun. The police were confronted with an emergency 
in which their own safety was at stake."22 However, unlike the cases cited 
by the Court, 23 the situation did not involve a search incident to a valid 
arrest, but rather a search followed by an arrest. Moreover, even if the 
search were deemed contemporaneous with the arrest under Chimel v. 
California,24 the area of such search extends only to the "arrestee's person 
and the area 'within his immediate control.' "25 If the trash barrel was 
within a constitutionally protected area on the defendant's premises, 
then it hardly seems that the search can be justified by what was ultimately 
found in the barrel. If there was any emergency, it appears to have been 
created by the search itself.26 
§1.3. Warrantless automobile searches.1 Carroll v. United States2 
and its progeny have created special rules in the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to automobile searches. In particular, the cases have 
20 See Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972) (remanding case for 
determination of standing to object). See also Commonwealth v. Stevens, 1972 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1095, 1099-1100, 283 N.E.2d 673, 676-77 (remanding case for 
further inquiry into reliability of informant's information). 
21 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1611, 275 N.E.2d 146. 
22 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1611, 1612, 275 N.E.2d 146, 147. 
23 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Commonwealth v. Blackburn, 
354 Mass. 200, 237 N.E.2d 35 (1968). 
24 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
25 Id. at 763. 
26 A different situation may exist when the trash barrel is placed on public 
property for trash col1ection. But see California v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 
P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded, 41 U.S.L.W. 3224, 
3225 (U.S. Oot. 24, 1972). 
§ 1.3. 1 For a thorough analysis of the present state of the law of warrantless 
automobile searches, see the student comment, § 1.8, infra. 
2 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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§1.3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 9 
established that warrantless searches of moving vehicles are permissible 
if there is probable cause to believe that seizable articles are contained 
therein and "exigent circumstances" are present.3 It is the immediate 
mobility of the vehicle rather than its inherent mobility which creates the 
exception to the usual warrant requirement for searches. Accordingly, if 
a vehicle is impounded and not movable, a search warrant is required.4 
At the same time, however, a limited warrantless search of an automobile 
is permissible under the search incident to a valid arrest exception, and 
warrantless seizures are lawful in some instances under the "plain view" 
doctrine.5 
In Commonwealth v. Wilson6 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
warrantless seizure of a toy gun from the defendant's vehicle during a 
"stop and frisk" authorized by G.L., c. 41, §98.7 The police had found, 
near the scene of a robbery, a water pistol similar to one identified as the 
holdup gun in a second robbery. The police stopped the defendant's car, 
which matched the description of one in which suspicious activity had 
been observed. While they were checking the defendant's license and 
registration, an officer observed a water pistol on the floor between the 
defendant's legs. The defendant at first said he did not know how it got 
there, then explained that it probably belonged to his nephew. There-
after, defendant agreed to go to the police station to talk further about 
the water pistol. At the station, the defendant was given a Miranda warn-
ing which he said he understood. Following a discussion of his implica-
tion in the two robberies, defendant was booked for armed robbery. 
The defendant appealed his subsequent conviction for unarmed rob-
bery contending that the toy gun and the oral and written statements 
made by him at the police station were the fruits of an illegal interception 
of his automobile without probable cause and should have been sup-
pressed. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Judicial Court noted 
that G.L., c. 41, §98 "constitutionally permits a brief threshold inquiry 
where suspicious conduct gives the officer 'reason to suspect' the ques-
tioned person of 'unlawful design,' that is, that the person has committed, 
3 "Exigent circumstances" may exist when an automobile is "'stopped on the 
highway' . .. because the car is 'movable, the occupants are alerted, and the 
car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.''' (Court's 
emphasis). Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971). 
4 Preston v. Unhed States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). But cf. Cooper v. California, 
386 U.S. 58 (1967); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
5 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-72 (1971); Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
6 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1731, 276 N.E.2d 283. 
7 n.L., c. 41, §98 provides: "They [police officers] may examine all persons 
abroad whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design .... Persons so sus-
pected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves ... may be arrested 
by the police. . . ." 
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is committing, or is about to commit a crime."8 The Court pointed to 
other cases in which it had upheld the interception of an automobile for 
the purpose of conducting a similar inquiry.9 The Court then held: 
Upon the facts found by the judge, we think the officer had prob-
able cause to stop the defendant's car. Once the car was stopped it 
was not unlawful to see the toy gun, which was in plain view .... Its 
temporary seizure was an appropriate step in the continuing inquiry, 
and the defendant's incredible answers to questions about the gun 
justified further inquiry .... What was done from then until the de-
fendant was booked was done with the defendant's. consent.10 
Although the Court did not refer to Coolidge, clearly the warrantless 
seizure of the water pistol was lawful and within the scope of even the 
more narrow interpretation of the "plain view" doctrine expressed by 
Justice Stewart in Coolidge.11 There was a "prior justification" for the 
intrusion, namely G.L., c. 41, §98, and the discovery of the water pistol 
was apparently "inadvertent." 
In Commonwealth v. Haefeli,12 an appeal from a conviction for re-
ceiving stolen property, the Supreme Judicial Court again considered a 
motion to suppress the warrantless seizure of evidence from a car. In 
Haefeli a police officer (Officer Hughes) was investigating a theft of 
certain items stolen from a female victim, including her checks, credit 
cards, driver's license and supermarket check-cashing card. He was also 
investigating a series of offenses involving the passing of worthless checks 
by a girlrusing the victim's name. The officer had photographs of the girl 
and he knew the defendant from prior offenses. He had further informa-
tion that a male, fitting defendant's description, had been seen with the 
girl, and he knew the registration number and the name of the owner 
of the car they had been using. Acting on a tip, the officer staked out a 
real estate office and observed the defendant and the girl arrive in this 
car and enter the office. He followed them in, questioned them, and when 
they gave false names which did not match the name of the car's owner 
he arrested them. Thereafter, the officer went outside to the car pre-
sumably to verify its true owner. He shined a flashlight through a closed 
window and saw an envelope containing checks on the floor. He then 
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1731, 1733, 276 N.E.2d 283, 284 citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
9 Id. lilt 1733, 276 N.E.2d at 285 citing Commonwealth v. Dottin, 353 Mass. 
439, 442, 233 N.E.2d 304, 305-06 (1968), and Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 356 
Mass. 337, 340, 251 N.E.2d 894, 896 (1969). 
10 Id. at 1733, 276 N.E.2d at 285. 
11 403 U.S. at 466. The Supreme Court is divided on the question whether 
"inadvertency" is a prerequisite to a valid seizure under the "plain view" doc-
trine. See note 14 § 1.2, suprll. 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 279 N.E.2d 915. 
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entered the car, seized the checks, continued his search and discovered 
the victim's check-cashing identification card in the glove compartment. 
At the outset, it might be questioned what standing the defendant had 
to object to the seizure. It seems fairly well established that he would 
have no standing unless the car were his, 13 or unless the car were in his 
possession at the time of search,14 or unless he were an occupant of the 
car at the time of search.15 The defendant did not qualify under any of 
these circumstances, yet the Court did not mention the standing question. 
Had it done so, the case might well have been decided far more simply.16 
With respect to the validity of the search and seizure, the Court noted 
that the officer had no warrant to search the car and that the search was 
not incident to the arrest. The question, then, was "whether there were 
exigent circumstances which permitted Officer Hughes to search the 
automobile without a warrant."17 In considering this question, the Court 
reviewed the leading United States Supreme Court cases on the subject 
of warrantless automobile searches, namely Carroll v. United States,1S 
Chambers v. Maroney,19 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire.20 The Court 
found that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge 
were "in seemingly irreconcilable disarray as to what the law was or 
ought to be"21 on this subject, found that the decisions of the United 
States Courts of Appeals "are in similar disarray,"22 and concluded with 
judicial resignation: 
Having traveled the length of the high road of the leading Federal 
judicial precedents without finding any very helpful signs pointing 
out the present state of the law on the SI\lbject of warrantless searches 
of automobiles, we return to our starting point and make a new start 
seeking only to determine whether Officer Hughes' search of and 
seizure from the automobile in this case were "unreasonable" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We hold that they were 
not.23 
It seems, however, that the Court greatly overstated the extent of the 
"disarray." The Supreme Court in Chambers made it quite clear that: 
13 United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). 
14 Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967). Simpson v. United 
States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). 
15 United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). But cf. Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). 
16 Of course, if the government failed to raise the standing question, the Court 
may have been justified in assuming that the defendant qualified. 
17 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 426, 279 N.E.2d 915, 918. 
18 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
19 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
20 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
21 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 429-30, 279 N.E.2d 915, 919. 
22 Id. at 430, 279 N.E.2d. at 920. 
23 Id. 31t 430-31, 279 N.E.2d at 920. 
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Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to 
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search. Carroll 
... holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause 
to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, 
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found 
again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate search is 
constitutionally permissible.24 
Thus, Chambers did not alter the basic Carroll rule. All it did was add 
the gloss that if the Carroll test is met, there is no constitutional differ-
ence between either making an immediate search of the automobile and 
seizing its contents, or immediately seizing the entire automobile and 
searching it later.25 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court was correct in noting a "disarray" 
of opinions in the subsequent Coolidge case, the disarray had nothing to 
do with the issue in Haefeli, and Coolidge in no way changed the basic 
rules of Carroll and Chambers. Indeed, Coolidge did not involve a war-
rantless search of a vehicle stopped on a highway as did those cases, but 
rather a seizure of an unoccupied, parked car in the defendant's drive-
way after the defendant had been arrested inside the house. A majority 
of the Coolidge Court26 agreed that 
The Court [in Chimel v. California] applied the basic rule that 
the "search incident to arrest" is an exception to the warrant require-
ment and that its scope must therefore be strictly defined in terms of 
justifying "exigent circumstances." The exigency in question arises 
from the dangers of harm to the arresting officer and of destruction of 
evidence within the reach of the arrestee .... Since the police knew 
of the presence of the automobile and planned all along to seize it, 
there was no "exigent circumstance" to justify their failure to obtain 
a warrant. The application of the basic rule of Fourth Amendment 
.law therefore requires that the fruits of the warrantless seizure be 
suppressed.27 
Despite the foregoing, the Supreme Judicial Court in Haefeli pro-
ceeded with its own rationale of "reasonableness." Thus, in the Court's 
view, when the defendant and the girl gave the officer false names "which 
did not match the name of the person he knew to be the registered owner 
of the automobile,"28 he "had reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
automobile was stolen or that it was being used without authority."29 
24 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). 
25 Id. at 52. 
26 Justices Stewart, Harlan, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined in Part 
II (D) of the Coolidge opinion. 403 U.S. at 473-84. 
27 403 U.S. 443, 478 (1971). 
28 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 431, 279 N.E.2d 915, 920. 
29 Ibid. 
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The Court held that the officer had probable cause to search the automo-
bile30 when, after placing the two suspects under arrest, the officer sub-
sequently saw the checks on the floor of the automobile. 
Given the existence of probable cause, were there "exigent circum-
stances" to permit a warrantless search? The Court said there were. 
We hold that the situation which existed before Officer Hughes saw 
the checks on the floor of the automobile constituted an exigency 
which justified his warrantless search for anything bearing on the 
ownership or right to use the automobile .•.. If he left the automo-
bile while he tried to obtain a search warrant, he could not be sure 
that it would be there when he returned. On all of the facts, reason-
ableness dictated that he do just what he did. His search of the auto-
mobile was therefore lawful.31 
This reasoning, however, raises serious questions. In the first place, 
Officer Hughes already knew the name of the registered owner of the 
automobile, and embarking on a confirmatory search for a registration 
certificate was hardly the result of exigent circumstances. The car was 
parked, both occupants had been arrested and it was unlikely that the car 
would be moved. If the officer had probable cause to search it, he had 
time to get a warrant. In fact, the Court's opinion quite clearly indicates 
that the police detective who assisted Officer Hughes in the arrest had ob-
tained a warrant that day for search of the defendant's apartment.32 He 
could just as easily have obtained one for search of the car. 
Furthermore, although the Court stated that "the justification for his 
search without a warrant did not derive from the fact that he observed 
the checks,"33 the Court nevertheless used that circumstance to justify the 
search by stating: 
In the present case, at least after seeing the checks protruding from 
an envelope on the floor of the automobile, Officer Hughes had prob-
able cause to believe that the checks were the fruits of prior thefts 
which the police were investigating and that they were instruments of 
the type used in the commission of the crimes of forging, uttering and 
passing worthless checks which they were also investigating.34 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court then attempted to align the case with Chambers suggesting 
that Chambers supported the search in Haefeli: 
30 Id. at 432, 279 N.E.2d at 921. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Id. a.t 435, 279 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
33 Id. at 432, 279 N.E.2d at 921. 
34 Id. at 433-34, 279 N.E.2d at 922. 
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In both cases . • . the police had reasonable cause to believe that 
the automobiles contained stolen goods and instruments used or to 
be used in the commission of a crime. Also, both automobiles were 
on public highways, and the drivers and all other ocoupants had been 
placed under arrest before the searches were made.35 
The pertinent inquiry, however, is not only whether the automobile is 
on a public highway (a circumstance which includes an unocoupied car 
parked against the curb) but also whether the car is immediately mobile. 
Moreover, it is not material that the drivers and occupants in both cases 
"had been placed under arrest before the searches were made" since that 
circumstance includes no space or time limitations. In Chambers the police 
stopped a moving vehicle, arrested the occupants, and searched the vehicle 
in a single contemporaneous operation. By contrast, in Haefeli the police 
interrogated and arrested the occupants inside an office, then proceeded to 
search an unoccupied vehicle parked in the street. This search did not 
qualify as a search incident to an arrest, and hardly involved the exigency 
of a movable car. On the facts, the car had the same constitutional status as 
a house. It is doubtful that the Court would have permitted a warrantless 
search of the defendant's house solely on the ground that the officer saw 
the evidence in question through a window. Contrary treatment of the 
car appears incorrect.36 
An analysis more consonant with the automobile search and seizure 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court appeared in United States 
v. Curwood,37 decided by the Massachusetts federal district court during 
the SURVEY year. There, the court held that a warrantless seizure of 200 
pounds of hashish from the trunk of a vehicle backed up to a loading 
platform was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. 
In Curwood a large quantity of hashish was discovered by customs 
agents in false-bottomed crates shipped to Logan Airport from India. 
The agents repacked the hashish and delivered the shipment to the con-
signee's commercial premises in Andover. While a search warrant was 
being sought in Cambridge, an agent observing the Andover premises 
reported via radio that shortly after shipment two footlockers had been 
transferred from the storage area of the premises to the trunk of a vehicle. 
The agent who subsequently searched the vehicle and seized the hashish 
had heard the radio report and thus had probable cause to conduct the 
search. As to the exigency of a warrantless search, the court noted that: 
The vehicle was being used for an illegal purpose; it contained con-
traband; it was being prepared for flight; and it was not "regularly 
parked in the driveway of [petitioner's] house." ... Only when it 
eventually developed that the automobile was being used for a crimi-
nal purpose did the agents determine to seize it and search the con-
35 Id. at 434, 279 N.E.2d at 922. 
36 Other issues raised in the decision are discussed in §1.7, infra. 
37 338 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1972). 
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tents of its trunk. To hold that, under such circumstances, the agents 
were required to secure another search warrant, during which time 
the automobile likely would have departed the scene with its cargo 
of contraband, is to impose a standard of official conduct not pre-
scribed by the Fourth Amendment or by the interpretive decisions of 
the Supreme Court. 38 
15 
The key fact that the car was being prepared for flight at a loading plat-
form created the exigency and thus legitimized the search. The tenor of 
the situation was one of immediate mobility, the exigent ciroumstance 
absent in H aefeli. 
In Commonwealth v. Pignone39 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld 
the seizure of articles from an occupied, stopped vehicle. By prearrange-
ment with a check-out clerk, the defendant in Pignone took groceries 
from a store without paying for some of them. Following a conversation 
with the store manager (presumably about this incident), the defendant 
attempted to drive his car from the store parking lot with the groceries, 
but was blocked by two police cruisers. Without a warrant and without 
arresting the defendant, the police entered his car and seized the groceries. 
The trial judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
seized, apparently on the theory that a warrantless search of an automobile 
in the absence of arrest was unconstitutional. Reversing, the Court held 
that the proper inquiry was whether the police had probable cause to 
search the car, and that the defendant did not sustain his burden of 
proving the contrary.40 
From an evidentiary standpoint, the decision seems questionable since 
the defendant's burden of going forward is usually satisfied by showing 
merely that the search and seizure were conducted without a warrant.41 
There is no doubt that burden was satisfied since, at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, the agreed statement of facts stipulated that the 
police had no warrant to search defendant's vehicle.42 Contrary to the 
Court's holding, therefore, the burden should have shifted to the Com-
monwealth to prove not only that the police had probable cause to search 
the vehicle but also that the search and seizure was lawful under one of 
the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.43 Inas-
much as defendant was not placed under arrest, the search and seizure 
could not, as the trial judge recognized,44 be upheld on the basis of a 
search incident to arrest. The plain view doctrine mayor may not have 
been applicable depending on (1) whether the groceries had been con-
cealed in the trunk of the car or had been placed openly in the passenger 
38 Id. at 1114-15. 
39 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 281 N.E.2d 572. 
40 Id. at 740-41, 281 N.E.2d at 573. 
41 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
42 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 740, 281 N.E.2d 572. 
43 See 403 U.S. at 454-55. 
44 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 740, 281 N.E.2d 572, 573. 
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compartment45 and (2) whether "inadvertence," most likely absent in 
Pignone, is essential to invoke plain view.46 Under the automobile excep-
tion, the police intrusion seems justifiable based on the exigent circum-
stances present and on the assumption that there was probable cause to 
search the defendant's vehicle.47 The defendant was alerted, sitting at the 
wheel of his car, preparing to drive away. If the police had left to obtain 
a warrant, it is unlikely that they would have found the evidence after-
ward.48 
Thus, Pignone appears to be a correct decision under the "automobile 
exception," again assuming the police could have established probable 
cause to search. It is surprising, however, that the Supreme Judicial Court 
cited Haefeli and that portion of Coolidge which discussed the exigency 
requirement, yet limited the inquiry to whether the police had probable 
cause to search and eschewed the question of exigent circumstances. Per-
haps the Court recalled the difficulties it encountered with the applica-
tion of the exigency requirement in H aefeli and was unwilling to probe 
further into that uncertain area. On the other hand, by disposing of the 
case on the ground that defendant had not established the absence of 
probable cause to search, the exigency question was not and need not 
have been decided. In any event, Pignone may unfortunately be in-
terpreted to mean that to the extent H aefeli recognized exigency as an 
essential element of the "automobile exception," Pignone overruled it sub 
silentio and that in Massachusetts a warrantless search of an automobile 
is valid so long as the police can establish probable cause to search. 
§1.4. Warrantless arrest and search. It has long been the law that 
a warrantless search may be made incident to a lawful arrest, so long 
as the search is limited at the time of arrest to the person and the place 
where the arrest occurs.llf the arrest is invalid because, for example, there 
is no probable cause to arrest, then the search is likewise invalid. In 
Commonwealth v. Stevens2 the Supreme Judicial Court considered the 
question of the legality of a warrantless arrest and search of the arrestee's 
person. 
In Stevens an F .B.1. agent reported to the police that a reliable in-
formant had disclosed to him that the defendant's automobile contained 
a large quantity of stolen jewelry. Within a half-hour the police, know-
ing of defendant's previous conviction for receiving stolen property, dis-
45 The opinron does not indicate in what part of the vehicle the groceries were 
locaJted when seized by the police. 
46 See note 11, supra. 
47 Probable cause, or the lack of it, was never established in Pignone. "No 
evidence was presented at the hearing on the question whether the police had 
probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 741, 
281 N.E.2d 572, 573. 
48 See 403 U.S. at 460 and text at note 24, supra. 
§1.4. 1 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-68 (1969) (containing history 
and analysis of the rule); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1095, 283 N.E.2d 673. 
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patched two officers to arrest defendant when he left his place of business. 
For most of the day, the officers kept defendant's automobile and store 
under surveillance until that evening when the defendant left the store 
and drove away in his car. With neither an arrest nor a search warrant, 
the officers followed the defendant, stopped his car and arrested him on 
suspicion of receiving stolen property. Thereupon, one officer searched 
defendant and found a pouch containing diamond rings and unset dia-
monds in one of his pockets. In a preliminary hearing the defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person was denied and 
he appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Court began by stating the standards for a valid arrest and search 
of the person, namely, whether at the time of arrest the police had prob-
able cause to believe that the defendant had committed or was committing 
an offense.3 Moreover, when the police rely on hearsay to establish prob-
able cause to arrest, there must be a "substantial basis for crediting the 
hearsay." The Court declared that two requirements were necessary to 
establish the credibility of hearsay information. First, there should be 
evidence of the informant's reliability, and second, there should be dis-
closure of the evidence upon which the informant bases his statements 
of the defendant's criminal activity.4 On the other hand, if the informant's 
tip fails to meet this "two-pronged test," the arrest and search may still be 
valid if the tip is sufficiently corroborated by other independent sources. 
Thus, sufficient corroboration may exist where the police observe sus-
picious acts of the defendant or where the informant gives a detailed 
description of the appearance, conduct and expected behavior of the 
defendant.5 
Applying the foregoing criteria to the facts in Stevens, the Court held 
that although the informant's reliability was established by the accuracy 
of information previously given to the F.B.I., there was no disclosure of 
the evidence upon which the informant based his information that de-
fendant's car contained stolen jewelry. Furthermore, the Court found 
that the independent circumstances, such as police observations of the 
defendant's conduct and the defendant's criminal record, were not suf-
ficiently corroborative. The Court noted that during the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, defense counsel's questions, apparently intended to 
challenge the credibility of the hearsay information, were excluded by 
the trial judge upon objections by the Commonwealth. However, rather 
than reverse the denial of the motion to suppress, the Court determined 
that the inquiry into the circumstances was insufficient to establish re-
liability of the hearsay information and remanded the case for a resump-
tion of the hearing.6 
Procedurally, the result in Stevens appears incorrect and irreconcilable 
, 3 Id. at 1096-97, 283 N.E.2d at 675. 
4 Id. at 1097, 283 N.E.2d at 675. 
5 Id. at 1097-98, 283 N.E.2d at 675. 
6 Id. at 1099-1100, 283 N.E.2d at 676-77. 
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with the Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Pignone,7 decided just 
two months prior to Stevens. In Stevens the defendant clearly sustained 
his burden of proving the absence of a search warrant and it is equally 
clear that the Commonwealth failed to show the existence of a search 
incident to a valid arrest based on probable cause. Moreover, the Com-
monwealth's objections were instrumental in producing a record which, 
on appeal, established the absence of probable cause. It would seem, then, 
that the Commonwealth ought to be bound by that record, yet the Court 
denied the defendant his apparent victory by remanding the matter to 
give the Commonwealth another chance. The defendant in Pignone, on 
the other hand, was not so fortunate. Instead of remanding, the Court 
simply reversed a trial judge who applied an incorrect standard in grant-
ing the defendant's motion to suppress. No opportunity was afforded 
the Pignone defendant to adduce evidence to meet the Court's "correct" 
and, in a sense, ex post facto standard. Certainly if the Court deemed it 
desirable that Stevens be remanded in the interest of justice, Pignone was 
an even more appropriate case for remand. Furthermore, it seems rather 
bizarre that the Court expected that on remand of Stevens the defendant 
would elicit facts which could aid the Commonwealth in establishing 
probable cause. On the record before the Court the defendant prevailed 
and it is doubtful that he would renew a line of questioning which might 
be damaging to him. 
§1.5. Plain view doctrine. It is well established that under certain 
circumstances police may seize evidence in plain view without a war-
rant if the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent and incident to legiti-
mate police activity, and there is a neX!Us between the item to be seized 
and criminal behavior.1 Thus, in Commonwealth v. Ross,2 a prosecution 
for armed robbery and related offenses, the defendant moved to suppress 
evidence of certain bloodstained paper money which fell from a co-
defendant's wallet during a routine inventory of his possessions at the 
police station.3 The Supreme Judicial Court held that under the plain 
view doctrine the police properly seized the bills when they observed the 
bloodstains.4 The bills had fallen from the wallet during a legitimate 
police search and the bloodstains provided sufficient nexus between the 
bills and the stabbing of the armed robbery victim. 
On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Hawkins,5 a more difficult 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 281 N.E.2d 572. See discussion of Pignone in §1.3, 
supra. 
§1.5. 1 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71, 505-10 (1971); 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). On the question whether inad-
vertency is an essential element of the "plain view" doctrine see § 1.2 note 14, supra. 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 282 N.E.2d 70. 
3 The Court noted that the Commonwealth did not challenge the defendant's 
standing to raise this point. Id. at 887, 282 N.E.2d at 79. 
4 Id. at 887-88, 282 N.E.2d at 80. 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 541, 280 N.E.2d 665. 
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situation arose. The police had obtained a search warrant authorizing 
a search for drugs at the defendant's apartment. During the search an 
officer found in a bureau drawer an envelope containing savings bonds 
with names and addresses thereon different from the defendant's. The 
officer then took the bonds to a police sergeant in another room of the 
apartment. By a telephone call to a person whose name appeared on 
some of the bonds, the sergeant confirmed that the bonds were stolen 
and the police arrested the defendant. Upon searching him they found 
an identification card in the bond owner's name. The defendant subse-
quently challenged the legality of the search and seizure of the bonds 
and identification card in a prosecution for receiving stolen bonds. 
The police admitted that they had no actual knowledge that the bonds 
were stolen until after investigating their ownership. The Court held the 
seizure invalid: 
The mere fact that the names on the bonds were different from that 
of the defendant was insufficient to provide probable cause for their 
seizure. . . . Once having ascertained the presence of bonds instead 
of drugs and without probable cause to believe they were stolen, their 
authority to possess the envelope and its contents ended.6 
The Court apologized for this "drastic" result, but said that the bonds 
could not be taken "from his possession, even momentarily, to establish 
their ownership."7 
This decision provoked a sharp dissent from Justice Braucher, who 
reasoned that (1) the police were justified in noting names and addresses 
on the bonds different from the defendant's; (2) the presence of the bonds 
in the defendant's apartment warranted a further threshold inquiry; (3) 
the removal of the bonds to an adjoining room was not a seizure; and 
(4) the police acquired probable cause after the telephone call to an owner 
named on one of the bonds.8 
In a later case, Commonwealth v. DeMasi,9 the police, in the course 
of a search of an apartment for stolen property, had seized items not listed 
in the search warrant. Distinguishing Hawkins, the Court upheld the 
seizure of the unlisted items since the police, unlike the police in Hawkins, 
had prior knowledge that similar items had been recently stolen and that 
the defendant usually "went after" such items. 
§1.6. Sufficiency of affidavit. The federal standards recited by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Stevens l for probable cause 
to arrest are the same as the federal standards for probable cause appli-
cable to an affidavit for a search warrant. The leading United States Su-
preme Court cases on the sufficiency of affidavits include Aguilar v. 
6 Id. at 542-43, 280 N.E.2d at 666. 
7 Id. at 544, 280 N.E.2d at 667. 
8 Id. at 544-45, 280 N.E.2d at 667-68 (dissenting opinion). 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1125, 283 N.E.2d 845. 
§1.6. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1095, 1097-98, 283 N.E.2d 673, 675. See the 
factual circumstances of Stevens, § 1.4, supra. 
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Texas2 and Spinelli v. United States.3 Massachusetts statutory standards 
for affidavits may be found in G.L., c. 276, §§2, 2A and 2B.4 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Stevens also had occasion to determine 
the validity of the affidavits for search warrants for the defendant's car. 
The affidavits, made after the defendant was in custody, recited the de-
fendant's arrest and the search which disclosed the pouch containing dia-
mond rings and unset diamonds and concluded with a statement that the 
affiant "[has] reason to believe that there are other diamonds and stolen 
jewelry in [defendant's] car."5 Because the affidavits "failed to set forth 
sufficient grounds for the issuance of the warrants,"6 the Court ruled the 
warrants invalid. Instead of reversing the denial of the motion to sup-
press, however, the Court remanded the case for a determination of 
whether there was probable cause for the search of the vehicle,7 im-
plicitly suggesting that even though the warrants were plainly invalid the 
searches might fall within the "automobile exception" of Chambers v. 
Maroney.8 
In Commonwe,alth v. Haefeli9 the defendant challenged the sufficiency 
of an affidavit for a search warrant in connection with his motion to 
suppress evidence of articles seized during the search of his apartment. 
Essentially, the affidavit recited that the affiant arrested the defendant 
and his female companion for receiving stolen property and for forging 
and passing stolen checks; that the affiant had "probable cause to believe, 
as a result of evidence found on these subjects (in their possession) at the 
time of their arrest, that these two subjects have been involved in the 
larcenies of mail (U.S.) on this District;" that these subjects, both of 901 
2 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
3 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
4 Sections 2 and 2A prescribe the form for a search warrant and direct the 
manner in which the police must execute a search warrant. Section 2B prescribes 
the form .of the affidavit and the procedure for issuance of a search warrant. 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1095, 1099, n.!, 283 N.E.2d 673, 676 n.!. 
6 Id. at 1099, 283 N.E.2d at 676. The United States District Court in United 
States v. Curwood, 338 F. Supp. 1104, 1119 (D. Mass. 1972) held invalid a 
similar affidavit in which the affiant stated merely, "I have determined," wil:hout 
setting forth the basis f.or his determination. 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1095, 1099-1100, 283 N.E. 2d 673, 676, citing Chambers 
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
8 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The C~)Urt's approach is similar to that of the state in 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970), where, in an attempt to justify 
a search made pursuant to an invalid warrant, New Hampshire sought to bring 
the search within one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement. In Stevens the search of the defendant's vehicle could arguably fall 
within the Chambers extension of the automobile exception since the defendant 
was stopped on a public highway, thus giving rise to a possible exigency. But 
see criticism of the Chambers rule in § 1.8, infra. The two officers sent to ar-
rest the defendant in Stevens maintained about a seven hour vigil outside de-
fendant's store yet apparently neither they nor imonned officers at police head-
quarters made an effort to obtain an arrest or a search warrant. See also criticism 
of the Supreme Judicial Court's remand of Stevens § 1.4, supra. 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 279 N.E.2d 915. 
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Beacon Street, Boston, "had identification in the name of one Mona 
Lacey . . . whose apartment had been burglarized;" that "checks and 
identification were reportedly stolen in this break;" and that "[b]ased 
upon the foregoing reliable information-and upon [the affiant's] per-
sonal knowledge and belief-and attached affidavits-there is probable 
cause to believe that the property hereinafter described-has been stolen-
or is being concealed, etc. and may be found" in their possession at those 
premises. The affidavit concluded with a non-specific listing of the kind 
of evidence sought, i.e. stolen mail, checks and identification cards, etc.10 
As articulated by the Court, the question presented was "whether the 
application and affidavit for the search warrant were legally sufficient 
to establish probable cause to believe that stolen mail, checks and identi-
fication material ... would be found in [defendant's apartment]." (Em-
phasis added).l1 The Court then briefly stated the standards for con-
struing an affidavit and held that a "judicial mind" could reasonably 
infer from the information in the affidavit that probable cause existed 
to believe that the articles stolen from the victim's apartment «could be 
found" in the defendant's apartment.12 The Court's choice of the more 
ambiguous word "could" rather than "would" is unfortunate inasmuch 
as "could" is susceptible to the alternative interpretation "might." Never-
theless, the latter interpretation is apparently the one intended, for the 
Court subsequently stated that it was reasonable to infer from the de-
fendant's possession of one of a number of articles stolen from the victim's 
apartment that the other stolen articles "might be found" in the de-
fendant's apartment.13 Such a probable cause standard will permit the 
broadest form of conjecture in search warrant affidavits and is inconsistent 
with the well-settled rule that probable cause must be based on more than 
mere suspicion or unsupported belief. 
Furthermore, Raefeli is a disappointing decision in that the Court 
superficially treated other fundamental deficiencies in the affidavit. In 
dismissing the defendant's contention that Spinelli v. United States14 
required the affiant to reveal the basis of his belief that the defendant 
and his female companion were involved in larcenies, the Court remarked 
that "the Spinelli decision is of questionable validity"15 in view of later 
comments about it in United States v. Rarris.l6 The Court concluded that: 
The affidavit before us makes clear that the basis of the affiant's be-
lief was in large part his experience earlier in the day in arresting the 
10 Id. at 435, n.4, 279 N.E.2d at 923, n.4. The form of the affidavit, with minor 
variations, followed the statutory form set forth in G.L., c. 276, §2B. With re-
spect to the phrase "and attached affidavits," the Court's opinion does not disclose 
the existence of any other affidavits. 
11 Id. at 436, 279 N.E.2d at 923. 
12 Id. at 436-37, 279 N.E.2d at 924. 
13 Id. at 437, 279 N.E.2d at 924. 
14 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
15 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 437-38, 279 N.E.2d 915, 924. 
16 403 U.S. 573 (1971). 
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two persons and finding in their possession something he knew had 
been stolen from the Lacey apartment. That is sufficient to support 
the issuance of the search warrantP 
But as a matter of logic, the mere arrest of the defendant and the dis-
covery of stolen items in his "possession" was not sufficient to establish 
probable cause to believe that other stolen items were in his apartment. 
There were no facts recited in the affidavit to support the affiant's be-
lief; that belief must therefore be regarded as a mere conclusion. Such 
unsupported conclrusions have long been held constitutionally inadequate 
on the basis for issuance of a search warrant. IS 
In addition, neither Spinelli nor Harris altered the probable cause 
standards for affidavits, but involved disputes over the degree to which 
an informant's tip need be corroborated, an issue not present in Haefeli. 
In fact, in Harris Chief Justice Burger stated that "the informant's ad-
mission that over a long period and currently he had been buying illicit 
liquor on certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that prop-
erty and furnished probable cause to search."19 As a minimum, then, 
Harris requires that the premises to be searched must somehow be im-
plicated. In H aefeli, however, there were no circumstances to implicate 
the defendant's apartment in any way. Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial 
Court's attempt to minimize Spinelli with Harris is unavailing, and 
Harris itself suggests that Haefeli may well be wrongly decided.2o 
§1.7. Sufficiency of search warrant. The only published Massachu-
setts case dealing with the sufficiency of a search warrant during the 
SURVEY year was United States v. Curwood,1 decided by the United 
States District Court. There, in prosecutions for receiving and transport-
ing illegally imported hashish, the court held that the search warrant 
designated with sufficient particularity the place to be searched by de-
scribing the premises as a "'barn red wood frame, 2 story commercial 
structure, 208' long and 85' wide situated and numbered 63 Park Street, 
17 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 437, 279 N.E.2d 915, 924. The Court's opinion 
did not mention what, if anything, was found in the possession of the defendant 
and his female 'companion at the time of their arrest. Presumably, the items found 
were those seized without a warrant from the parked automobile after the arrest 
of the pair. If that search were invalid, it is difficult to see how a subsequent affi-
davit based on it could be valid. 
18 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1964). 
19 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971). 
20 Compare Commonwealth v. Anderson, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1145, 284 N.E.2d 
219, decided during the SURVEY year, in which the Supreme Judicial Court had 
no difficulty applying federal authority, including Spinelli and Harris, in a case 
involving an affidavit which rather clearly and factuaIIy implicated the defendant's 
premises. See also Commonwealth v. Stevens, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 649, 281 
N.E.2d 224 (rescript opinion holding affidavit too general and inconclusive to 
satisfy the statutory rules in G.L., c. 276, §§2A, 2B and 2C. 
§1.7. 1 338 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1972). 
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Andover, Mass.'''2 The warrant was not insufficient merely because (1) 
a "breezeway" interrupted the enclosed continuity of the building, (2) 
the building was occupied by other tenants, (3) the building varied in 
height, or (4) the dimensions stated included an uncovered courtyard and 
a parking area outside the building. The governing principle was whether 
the warrant on its face identified the place to be searched with enough 
precision to enable an officer with reasonable effort to ascertain and 
identify the place intended.3 In addition, the court noted that even if 
the description were overbroad, that fact would not necessarily invalidate 
the search as actually conducted, if, for example, it were restricted to 
that part of the building to which the warrant should have been limited.4 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§1.8. Warrantless automobile searches: The "automobile" excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitutionl has been interpreted to require a warrant for all 
searches "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions."2 One exception is the "automobile exception,"3 first an-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States,4 
which sanctions the warrantless search of an automobile when there is a 
likelihood it will be driven out of reach of the police before a search 
warrant is obtained. When such a likelihood, denoted by the Supreme 
Court as an "exigency," exists, police may search without a warrant 
2 Id. at 1110. 
3 Id. at 1112, citing Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). 
4 Id. at 1111, n.l1. 
§ 1.8. 1 The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shaH issue, but upon probable 
cause, suppor-ted by author affinnation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
3 Other exceptions to the warrant requirement, not discussed in this comment, 
are: (1) the "search incident to arrest," exception, under which a warrantless 
search for weapons or destructible evidence within the area of control of the 
arrestee is admissible; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); (2) the "plain 
view doctrine" which allows the admission of evidence which comes into the plain 
view of 'a police officer while he is searching for other specific objects pursuant 
to a valid search warrant or of evidence which comes into the plain view of an 
officer whenever the officer's initial intrusion is protected by one of the other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement; Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); (3) the con:sent exception under which 
a search is lawful if the party searched gives hill consent to a warrantless search; 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 
rev'd on Tehearing on o~heT grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). Although am. auto-
mobile, as well as a building, might be searched without a warrant under any of 
these exceptions, this comment will be concerned with the automobile exception 
alone. 
4 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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either at the scene where the automobile is first encountered,5 or at 
police headquarters.6 
There has been some dissatisfaction with the automobile exception in 
recent years? In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,s its latest decision on the 
subject, the United States Supreme Court sought to devise workable 
rules that would aid both the police and the courts in determining the 
legality of a warrantless automobile search; yet dissatisfaction persists. 
Justice Harlan, concurring in Coolidge, stated: 
From the several opinions that have been filed in this case it is ap-
parent that the law of search and seizure is due for an overhauling. 
State and federal law enforcement officers and prosecutorial authori-
ties must find quite intolerable the present state of uncertainty .... 9 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth 
v. Haefeliio is just one illustration of the perplexity existing in state and 
lower federal courts with the status of the federal law governing warrant-
less searches.l1 This comment will analyze the existing law of warrantless 
automobile searches as expressed in several United States Supreme Court 
opinions in an effort to isolate the sources of the present uncertainty in 
the state and lower federal courts. Consideration will be given to three 
alternative approaches to the problem. 
Federal standards of the automobile exception. In Carroll v. United 
States,l2 there was probable cause to believe that the defendants' auto-
mobile, which had been stopped on the open highway by federal pro-
hibition agents, contained contraband liquor; therefore, probable cause 
to search the vehicle existed. However, since the agents had no informa-
tion that a crime had been committed, they lacked probable cause to 
arrest the occupants. If the agents had attempted to secure a search war-
rant from a local magistrate, the automobile could easily have been 
driven out of the warrant's jurisdiction.13 The Court upheld the de-
5Id. 
6 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
7 See Note, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 1011, 1027-30 (1971); Comment, 47 Notre Dame 
Law. 668 (1972). 
8 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §l8.9 at 524. 
9 Id. at 490. 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 279 N.E.2d 915. See discussion of Haefeli § 1.3, 
supra. 
11 Federal Fourth Amendment law is binding upon the states. Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Haefeli, the 
Court candidly confessed that it did not understJand the federal law. "[We have] 
traveled the length of the high road of the leading Federal judicial precedents 
without finding any very helpful signs pointing out the present state of the law on 
the subject of warrantless searches of automobiles .... " 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
430-31, 279 N.E.2d at 920. 
12 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
13 The Court in Carroll did not expressly require exigency for a warrantless 
search. However, the rationale for the warrantless search was based on conditions 
(the imminent possibility of the vehicle being driven away) which amount to 
exigency. The later decisions of Chambers aIIld Coolidge, relying upon Carroll, 
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femlants' convictions based on the evidence (liquor) discovered during 
the warrantless search of the automobile. 
In Chambers v. Maroney,14 the police had knowledge that a specific 
robbery had been committed and witnesses' descriptions of the robbers 
provided probable cause to believe that the defendants had committed the 
crime. Shortly after the report of the robbery, the defendants' car was 
stopped by the police, who, after arresting the defendants, took their 
automobile to the police station and searched it without a warrant. The 
Supreme Court upheld the admission of evidence discovered in the 
search, holding that a warrantless search at the station was permissible 
where, under Carroll, the search would have been permitted at the time 
the automobile was first encountered by the police.15 In Carroll, the war-
rantless search of an automobile was upheld on the grounds of exigent 
circumstances created by the imminent threat of the automobile being 
driven away. In Chambers, on the other hand, the Court upheld a search 
despite the fact that no real possibility existed that the car would be 
driven away, so long as it remained in police custody. The Court in 
Chambers did not explain why the warrantless search at the police station 
should be permitted, when any exigency that may have existed at the 
scene had dissipated. Presumably in justification of the search at the 
police station the Court suggested that a search of the automobile at the 
scene, a dark parking lot, would have been dangerous,17 Undoubtedly, 
dangerous circumstances may justify delay of the search until the car has 
been removed to the police station; but once the car has been immobilized 
at the police station, clearly any exigency that may have justified a search 
at the scene has disappeared and a warrant should be obtained. 
Admitting that all exigency has passed when a car is taken into police 
custody, the Supreme Court in Coolidge nevertheless reaffirmed the 
Chambers holding,18 "The rationale of Chambers is that given a justi-
fied initial intrusion, there is little difference between a search on the 
open highway and a later search at the station."19 (Court's emphasis). 
have expressly required exigency. "Only in exigent circumstances will the judg-
ment of the police 'as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a 
search." 399 U.S. at 51. "Here there was probable cause, but no exigent circum-
stances justified the police in proceeding without a warrant .... [The] search ... 
was therefore illegal." 403 U.S. at 464. 
14 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
15 Id. at 52. 
16 See note 13, supra. 
17 399 U.S. at 52, n.lO. Accor.d, United States v. Ware, 457 F.2d 828, 830 
(7th Gir. 1972), where a warrantless search Df an automobile at the police station 
after an arrest was justified partly on the basis Df the fact that a search at the 
scene of arrest was impractical because the autDmobile was blocking traffic. In 
Isaac v. State, - Ind. - , 274 N.E.2d 231, 236 (1971), a warantless search 
at the police station was justified because of rain and heavy traffic at the scene. 
18 403 U.S. at 463. 
19 403 U.S. at 463, n.20. 
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This statement is hardly consistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions 
holding that a search of a vehicle incident to the occupant's arrest which 
is permissible at the scene of arrest is not permissible at police head-
quarters, because the latter search is conducted remotely in time and 
place from the scene of arrest.20 The search incident to arrest must be 
contemporaneous with arrest, and is 
justified ... by the need to seize weapons and other things which 
mi~ht be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by 
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of a crime, things 
which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the 
accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justi-
fications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from 
the arrest. Once an acoused is under arrest and in custody, then a 
search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not in-
cident to the arrest.21 
Analogous reasoning should apply to the automobile exception,22 since 
the justification for a warrantless search no longer exists when the auto-
mobile is in police custody.23 
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Chambers, argued that a warrantless 
search of an automobile at the police station could not be justified under 
the Carroll exigency rationale. He suggested an "immobilization rule" 
under which the police would be permitted to take custody of a vehicle 
in all exigent circumstances, and delay the search until a warrant could 
be secured.24 
Justice White, speaking for the majority in Chambers, rejected such a 
rule because he considered a warrantless immobilization of a vehicle to 
be as much an intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights as a warrantless 
search of the vehicle.25 According to his view, immobilization is equiva-
lent to a seizure, and the Fourth Amendment requires warrants for both 
searches and seizures. What Chambers seems to sanction, however, is the 
worst of both worlds-both a warrantless seizure of the automobile at the 
scene, and a warrantless search of the automobile at the police station. 
While Justice White did not comment on this seeming inconsistency in 
20 Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968); Preston v. 
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). 
21 376 U.S. at 367. 
22 Cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62-64 (1967) (Dougl33, J., dissenting). 
23 People v. Weaver, 35 Mich. App. 504, 513, 192 N.W.2d 572, 575 (1971), 
offers an interesting view of the possible rationale of the Chambers holding. The 
court maintains that to require the police to obtain warrants for all automobile 
searohes conducted at the station would encourage searches at the scene, even in 
dangerous circumstances. However, it is questionable whether police are so re-
luctant to secure search warrants, that they would endanger themselves merely to 
avoid this task. 
24 399 U.S. at 61-65. The "immobilization rule" is discussed in 1971 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §18.9 at 531, and is examined infra. 
25 399 U.S. at 51-52. 
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Chambers, he explained in his dissenting Coolidge opinion that the war-
rantless search at the police station must be immediate, so that the auto-
mobile could be released to the owner without delay.26 He maintained 
that when the automobile is in police custody in a Chambers situation, an 
immediate search without a warrant is less of an intrusion upon Fourth 
Amendment rights than a search delayed until a warrant is secured. In 
Coolidge, three searches of the automobile were conducted after it had 
been taken into police custody. The first occurred two days after seizure, 
the others eleven and fifteen months later. Justice White believed that 
the two latter searches were so delayed as to be outside the Chambers 
rule, even though a search warrant would take less than two days to 
secure. Notwithstanding Justice White's willingness in Coolidge to extend 
the period of immediacy to two days, the Supreme Court has not at-
tempted to formulate a rule limiting the period of time within which a 
warrantless search can lawfully be made at the police station.27 
In Coolidge, the significance of one major difference between the facts 
of Chambers and Carroll was apparently overlooked by the Court. In 
the Carroll situation, there was probable cause to search the automobile, 
but not to arrest the occupants. In such a situation, the exigency for an 
immediate, warrantless search exists, absent unusual circumstances.28 
If the police stop the vehicle, and are then required to secure a warrant 
before they are permitted to search, the occupants could drive away, since 
there is no probable cause to arrest them. In a Chambers-at-the-scene 
situation, police have probable cause both to search the vehicle and to 
arrest all the occupants. If in such situation the occupants are arrested, 
the exigency created by the automobile's mobility is greatly reduced, if 
not entirely eliminated. Even if the police leave the vehicle unattended 
while they secure a warrant, there is less likelihood that an accomplice or 
car thief will drive the vehicle away than in the Carroll situation where 
the unarrested occupants have free access to the vehicle. Furthermore, 
if the police immobilize a vehicle in the Chambers situation until a war-
rant is seoured, the occupants will endure little inconvenience, because 
they are in police custody.29 
Coolidge was a case involving the murder of a fourteen year old girl. 
The New Hampshire police conducted an intensive investigation, and 
eventually accumulated evidence pointing to the guilt of the defendant. 
26 403 U.S. at 523. 
27 Other courts have not been so hesitant. In People v. Emert, 1 III. App.3d 993, 
274 N.E.2d 364 (1971), the court suppressed evidence obtained by warrantless 
search conducted three days after seizure of a vehicle because such delay was 
unreasonable. In People v. Weaver, 35 Mich. App. 504, 192 N.W.2d 572 (1971), 
evidence from a warrantless search at headquarters conducted two days after seizure 
was suppressed. 
28 An example of such an unusual circumstance would be a situation where 
the automobile was immobilized by a traffic accident. 
29 It is possible that the occupants will receive bail before the warrant is secured. 
See note 57, infra. 
25
Semerjian: Chapter 1: Search and Seizure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
28 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §1.8 
One element of this evidence was an eyewitness report that an automobile 
matching the description of one of the defendant's automobiles was 
parked on the night of the murder near the place where the victim's 
body was found. For some time before the police actually arrested the 
defendant, they intended to search his automobile for microscopic 
particles which might indicate whether the victim had been in the de-
fendant's car. The police, however, left the vehicle in the defendant's 
possession for a substantial period of time before they arrested the de-
fendant. After the arrest and until the police seized the car the follow-
ing day, they maintained a guard on the defendant's house and the car 
which had been parked in the driveway. Although the police had probable 
cause to search the defendant's car, the Court held that the exigency 
justifying a warrantless search of an automobile does not automatically 
exist whenever there is probable cause to search; exigency sufficient to 
justify a warrantless search must be established independently of the 
determination of probable cause. Since such exigency did not exist in 
Coolidge, the search was not legitimized under the automobile exception.30 
The facts of the Coolidge case are unusual in the sense that rarely 
are police presented with a situation where there exists such a lack of 
exigency to search an automobile unless, of course, the automobile is in 
police custody.31 Except for the police, no one, including the defendant, 
even suspected that the car contained any evidence, since as noted above, 
the evidence consisted of microscopic particles. Thus, there was no 
reason for anyone to drive the car away for the purpose of removing evi-
dence of the crime. The automobile was mobile, in the sense that it was 
operable and someone could conceivably have gained access to it and 
slipped by the police guard in it; however, the Court attached "no con-
stitutional significance to this sort of mobility."32 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court has not established adequate 
and logical guidelines to assist police and courts in evaluating the exigency 
or nonexigency of given circumstances. The unusual fact situation in 
Coolidge makes it a poor guideline for determining whether other cir-
cumstances are exigent or not.33 Two cases illustrate the inconsistency 
30 403 U.S. at 464. 
31 The police themselves determined that a warrant was required; indeed, they 
actually did secure warrants for the defendant's arrest and for the search and 
seizure of his automobile. The Supreme Court, reversing the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court ruling in State v. Coolidge, 10'6 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965), 
held that the warrants were invalid because they were not issued by a neutral and 
detached magistrate as required by the Fourth Amendment, and thus the searches 
were carI'ied out as if there were no warrant. The warrant had been issued by the 
New Hampshire Attorney General. 403 U.S. at 449-53. 
32 403 U.S. at 461, n.18. 
33 But d. Cook v. Johnson, where evidence (fingerprints) from a warrantless 
search of a vehicle parked in the defendant's garage conducted after defendant's 
arrest was suppressed, the court stating that "[t]he facts of this case are strikingly 
similar to those in Coolidge v. New Hampshire." 459 F.2d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 
1972) . 
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which results from the iack of appropriate guidelines. In United States v. 
Payne,34 probable cause to search a vehicle for illegal drugs existed, but 
probable cause to arrest the defendants was lacking. The car was parked 
in a National Park, and the defendants were preparing to bed down in 
sleeping bags for the night when the warrantless search was carried out. 
The court held the search illegal on the ground that exigency was lack-
ing; because the defendants were bedding down, there was no danger 
of the vehicle being driven away before a warrant could be obtained. In 
U;lited States v. Sharpe,35 the defendants had been arrested. Their truck, 
which had been used in a train robbery, was found immobilized on an 
embankment, and had to be towed off. The court upheld a warrantless 
search, on the ground that the truck was not permanently immobile. 
Comparing the two cases, it would seem that a greater degree of exigency 
existed in Payne than in Sharpe. In Payne, the defendants might have 
arisen early and driven away in the vehicle before a warrant was secured, 
but in Sharpe the vehicle was stuck on an embankment and abandoned. 
Moreover, the defendants were arrested before the truck was discovered. 
In Coolidge, by way of dicta, the Supreme Court did state that it was 
clear "that there is a significant constitutional difference between stopping, 
seizing, and searching a car on the open highway, and entering private 
property to seize and search an unoccupied, parked vehicle .... "36 
The former situation describes Carroll and Chambers-at-the-scene, the 
latter describes Coolidge. In Commonwealth v. Haefeli,37 the occupants 
parked an automobile and went into an office. After arresting the oc-
cupants inside the office, a police officer looked through a window of the 
automobile, observed evidence which gave him probable cause to search 
and proceeded warrantlessly to search the parked vehicle. The situation 
of the searched vehicle in H aefeli lies between the two situations postu-
lated in the Coolidge dicta quoted supra, since the vehicle was parked 
and unoccupied, but it was not on private property. Coolidge does not 
explain why there is a significant difference in automobile searches de-
pending on whether or not the automobile is parked, unoccupied, or on 
private property.38 The distinction is not a very helpful standard for 
determining whether an exigency exists. A vehicle could be stopped on 
a public highway and no exigency might exist, if, for example, all the 
34 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1970). 
35 452 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1971). 
36 403 U.S. at 463, n.20. 
37 1972 Mass Adv. Sh. 423, 279 N.E.2d 915. For the facts of this case, see 
§ 1.3., supra. 
38 Perhaps the Court reasoned that a car on a public highway is more likely 
to be moved than a car parked in a private driveway; or that the usual warrant 
requirements for searches of homes apply to some extent to vehicles when they 
are parked in a private driveway. It might also be argued that an unoccupied and 
parked vehicle is less likely to be driven away than one occupied and stopped while 
in use (although if all the occupants are arrested, it is difficult to perceive a 
substantial difference). 
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occupants were arrested and the car was removed to police headquarters. 
On the other hand, exigency might exist where the car was occupied and 
parked in a private driveway if someone who either was not or could not 
be arrested intended to drive the vehicle away. 
On the basis of the fact patterns in the cases discussed above, it is 
possible to define at least four degrees of exigency. The first and greatest 
degree of exigency is the Car:roll situation, where there is probable cause 
to search, but not to arrest, and the occupant is in the process of driving 
the vehicle.39 In such situations, police must either make an immediate, 
warrantless search or in all probability lose the opportunity to search at 
all. The second degree of exigency exists where there is probable cause 
to search a vehicle which is not in the process of being driven, or im-
mediately about to be driven, but a possibility exists that a known 
(though perhaps unidentified) person, who has not been or cannot be 
arrested by the police, would drive off in the vehicle before a search 
warrant could be secured. An example of this is the situation where 
police locate a parked, unoccupied vehicle which they have probable 
cause to search in connection with a crime and a known accomplice is 
still at large.40 In such a situation, there is the distinct possibility that the 
accomplice will attempt to gain access to the automobile while the police 
are securing a warrant. The exigency, however, is of a lesser degree than 
that of Carroll, as there is only a possibility of such attempt by an accom-
plice rather than a probability.41 The third, and probably the most com-
mon degree of exigency arises in situations similar to that in Chambers 
at-the-scene, and H aefeli. All occupants of the automobile have been ar-
rested,42 and there was no evidence of accomplices; therefore, the possi-
bility that someone would remove the automobile was arguably rather 
remote. The fourth degree is the situation of negligible exigency which 
arises in search at police headquarters as in Chambers, or in situations 
39 In United States v. Gomori, 437 F.2d 312 (4th Gir. 1971), a police officer 
knew stolen furniture was being ,shipped in rented trucks along a certain highway. 
The officer stopped a rented truck along this highway one night; he determined 
that the truck was carrying a heavy load by observing the way it was weighted 
down. When the driver denied that he was carrying any load, probable cause to 
search the truck, but not to arrest the driver, arose. The immediate warrantless 
search did indeed reveal stolen furniture. 
40 United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d 962 (2d Gir. 1972); United States v. Gas-
taldi, 453 F.2d 506 (7th Gir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1972). 
41 United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1970), should also be cate-
gorized under the second degree of exigency. The defendants were not driving, or 
immediately about to drive the vehicle, since they were bedding down for the night. 
A possibility existed, however, that they would arise and drive the vehicle away 
before a warrant could be secured. 
42 It is true ,that technically the car in Haefeli was not occupied; however, the 
police officer had observed the defendants leave the car and he arrested them 
nearby. For convenience, it 1'8 'appropriate here to refer to them as occupants. 
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such as Coolidge.43 It is submitted that a more logical and practical rule 
for automobile searches can be devised, by formulating a rule based on 
these four degrees of exigency. 
Alternative approaches. In the foregoing discussion, the current auto-
mobile exception law was criticized on three points, namely, (1) searches 
are permitted at the station as in Chambers, where there is no real 
exigency, (2) no distinction has been drawn by the Supreme Court 
between a search where there is no probable cause to arrest the occupants 
and a search where there is such probable cause and (3) there are no 
real guidelines to aid law enforcement officers or state and lower federal 
courts in the determination of exigency. The following discussion will 
analyze three alternative theories, anyone of which, if adopted by the 
Supreme Court, could minimize the uncertainty in the law of warrant-
less automobile searches and restore a measure of consistency to court 
decisions involving the alUtomobile exception. 
The "auto as person" rule. This alternative was advocated by Justice 
White, dissenting in Coolidge.44 The "auto as person" rule would per-
mit the warrantless search of an automobile whenever probable cause 
existed for the search, regardless of considerations of exigency. In that 
automobiles are utilized by persons as a more efficient personal means of 
transit, they are like an extension of the person. Just as a warrant is not 
required whenever there is probable cause to arrest and search a person,45 
a warrant ought not to be required for an automobile search.46 The "auto 
as person" rule would simplify matters for police, who would not have 
to make contemporaneous decisions as to the existence of exigency, and it 
would also eliminate the issue of exigency for the courts, leaving only 
the probable cause issue common to all searches. 
The "auto as person" rule, however, would tend to erode Fourth 
Amendment protection. While an automobile is like an extension of a 
person, it can also be considered an extension of a home or office since 
persons occupy automobiles, store personal belongings within them and 
often equip them with many of the conveniences of home. One dis-
tinguishing feature between an automobile and a home or office is mo-
bility. When there is reason to believe that the automobile will be driven 
out of reach of the police, mobility becomes a relevant distinction. If, 
however, mobility is curtailed completely or is only remotely possible, no 
substantial distinction can be drawn between the search of an automobile 
and the search of a home or office. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the fundamental importance of the "right of personal se-
43 This same degree of negligible exigency exists whenever a vehicle is in-
operable, as in United States v. Sharpe, 452 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1971), discussed 
supra. 
44 403 U.S. at 524-27. 
45 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
46 The one exception, according to Justice White, is where the car has been 
taken into police custody, and the searoh has been delayed beyond a reasonable 
length of time. 403 U.S. at 523. 
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curity against arbitrary intrusions by official power," which right was 
won "by revolution on this continent.','47 
The "immobilization rule." This rule, which was suggested by Justice 
Harlan, dissenting in Chambe:rs,48 would require a search warrant in 
almost every instance of automobile search. Rather than making an im-
mediate warrantless search at the scene or at the station, police would 
be permitted to immobilize or impound the vehicle whenever possible 
until a warrant could be secured. In situations where police could not 
both immobilize a vehicle and secure a search warrant,49 an immediate, 
warrantless search would be justified. 
Justice Harlan and Justice White disagreed on the question whether 
a warrantless seizure (immobilization) or a warrantless search was a lesser 
intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights. 50 Which is the greater intrusion 
would seem to depend on particular circumstances; for example, in the 
Chambers and Haefeli situations the ",immobilization rule" seems mani-
festly reasonable. If the occupants of the automobile have all been ar-
rested, it is unlikely that the immobilization of the vehicle would incon-
venience the occupants. However, in the Carroll situation seizure of the 
vehicle by police could be a substantial intrusion upon the occupants' 
rights.51 The inconvenience would be particularly great if the occupants 
were far from their home, or if suitable alternative means of transporta-
tion were unavailable. Justice Harlan suggested that the occupants could 
consent to an immediate search if they valued their privacy less than their 
right to present possession of their automobile.52 But such consent arguably 
is not really meaningful, coerced as it is by the threat of losing possession 
of the automobile. 
In addition to a potential infringement of Fourth Amendment rights, 
the "immobilization rule" could operate to the disadvantage of law en-
forcement officers. Under the rule, the police would have the right to 
seize the vehicle; but if there were no probable cause to arrest the occu-
pants, the police would not have the right to restrain them. Once a war-
rant is secured, the results of the search of the immobilized vehicle could 
provide probable cause to arrest the occupants. Meanwhile, the unre-
strained occupants would have ample time to make their escape. 53 
47 403 U.S. at 455. See cases cited 403 U.S. at 454-55, nnA-10. 
48 399 U.S. at 61-65. 
49 This situation might arise when a lone police officer stops a car at night, 
and for some reason is unable ,to secure the assistance of another officer for the 
purpose of removing the vehicle to police custody. 
50 The Fourth Amendment itself makes no distinction between a search and a 
seizure, insofar as warrant requirements are concerned. 
51 Temporary seizure would last for "perhaps a day" according to Justice 
Harlan. 399 U.S. at 63. 
52 Id. at 64. 
53 It should be noted that police are presented with the same problem when 
they must secure a warrant to search a home although, ordinarily the occupant 
would not be alerted. 
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A proposed rule. This rule involves a synthesis of the current Coolidge 
doctrine and the "immobilization rule" and rejects outright any warrant-
less search conducted while the automobile is in police custody. The 
proposed rule is intended to eliminate the logical and practical flaws in 
the present law by taking into account the four substantially different 
degrees of exigency encompassing virtually every automobile search situa-
tion. The key, therefore, to the proper application of the proposed rule 
is an accurate identification of the degree of exigency. 
In the Carroll situation, where there is probable cause to search but 
not to arrest, exigency of the first degree exists,54 and the proposed rule 
would authorize an immediate warrantless search. If an immediate 
search at the scene was thought to be dangerous or if the evidence sought 
was not readily capable of seizure as, for example, microscopic evidence 
or finger prints, the police would be permitted to immobilize or seize the 
vehicle, but a search would not be authorized until a warrant was se-
cured. In the Chambers and Haefeli situations, which are within the 
third degree of exigency, the police would not be authorized to make a 
warrantless search but the "immobilization rule" would be applied.55 
The occupants of the vehicle in a third degree exigency situation have 
all been arrested; therefore, they would not be inconvenienced by a 
seizure of the vehicle. Moreover, the application of the "immobilization 
rule" in these situations may serve the purpose of clearing the way for 
traffic, of protecting the vehicle from exposure to theft or vandalism, or 
of removing the vehicle to a safer and more convenient location for con-
ducting a search. With the automobile in police custody, a warrant can 
be secured with no danger of the evidence being removed or destroyed. 
If the arrestees are released on bail before a search warrant is secured 
and they refuse to consent to a continued warrantless immobilization of 
the vehicle, a first degree exigency arises and an immediate warrantless 
search would be justified. 
In the second degree of exigency situation, the proposed rule would 
permit immobilization or seizure of the vehicle but not a warrantless 
search. Here, the result is the same as for the third degree of exigency but 
for different reasons. Immobilization in the third degree situation is per-
mitted primarily because the arrested occrupants will not be substantially 
inconvenienced by the seizure of their vehicle. In the second degree situa-
tion, it is allowed primarily because of the danger that the owner, a known 
accomplice or other person at large may gain access to the vehicle. Of 
54 The same degree of exigency exists when there is probable cause to arrest 
only some of the occupants of a vehicle. 
55 Some difficulty might arise where police for some reason could not remove 
the vehicle to headquarters, or coultl not even place a guard over it until a war-
rant could be secured, as when a lone police officer makes the arrest, and cannot 
get reinforcements. In such a situation, sufficient exigency may exist to justify a 
warrantless search. 
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course, both considerations are relevant, to some extent, in all second and 
third degree situations. 
Often the second degree of exigency arises when the police locate, in 
a public area, a parked, unoccupied vehicle, which is known to have been 
involved in a crime. In United States v. Ellis,56 the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals upheld a warrantless search in such circumstances. The de-
fendants in Ellis were wanted'for bank robbery. A police officer discovered 
in a public parking lot a car belonging to the girl friend of one of the 
suspected robbers. There was probable caJUse to search the vehicle in con-
nection with the robbery. The court upheld defendants' conviction, and 
the admission of evidence from the warrantless search of the car, on the 
ground that exigency for the search existed at the time the officer found 
the car in the parking lot. The warrantless searches made by police in 
Ellis, and in a similar case, United States v. Castaldi,57 occurred after the 
vehicles had been seized and removed to police headquarters.58 Rather 
than permit either the actual warrantless search at police headquarters 
or the immediate warrantless search that the court would have allowed, 
the proposed rule would have permitted immobilization or seizure until 
a warrant could be secured. 
In all situations of the fourth degree of exigency, the proposed rule, 
consistent with the result in Coolidge, would require a search warrant 
and the police would not be permitted to immobilize or seize the vehicle. 
It is important to note, however, that under the proposed rule, immo-
bilization or seizure of a vehicle in the first, second or third degree of 
exigency situations would convert all those situations to a fourth degree 
exigency, and thus require the police to secure a search warrant. 
Conclusion. This comment has presented three alternatives to the pres-
ent automobile exception rule. The "auto as person" rule would allow 
police to search a vehicle without a warrant if probable cause to search 
existed. The rule would promote consistency and reduce complexity for 
police and courts, but would sacrifice a significant measure of Fourth 
Amendment protection. The "immobilization rule" would preserve Fourth 
Amendment protections relating to search, but not relating to seizure. 
The proposed rule would allow police to immobilize a vehicle where 
probable cause exists to arrest all the occupants, or where the automobile 
is not in use and persons who might have access to it in the future have 
not or cannot be arrested. The only circumstance in which a warrantless 
search would be permitted is where probable cause exists to search an 
occupied, movable vehicle, but not to arrest the occupants. It is sub-
mitted that adoption of the proposed rule would minimize the uncertainty 
56 461 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1972). 
57 453 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1972). 
58 The court in Ellis observed ,that the alternative of placing a guard on the 
vehicle would have been "impractical at a time when police manpower was being 
drained in an attempt to find the two robbers still at large." 461 F.2d at 966. 
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and confusion in the law of automobile searches by limiting the permissi-
bility of a warrantless automobile search to the Carroll situation and by 
permitting immobilization in many situations where, previously, the 
police were required to make difficult, contemporaneous determinations 
of exigency. 
ARNOLD E. COHEN 
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